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JUST FOLLOWING ORDERS: THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT’S INCOMPLETE ANALYSIS OF 
CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY CRAMDOWN 
IN IN RE VILLAGE AT CAMP BOWIE 
Abstract: On February 26, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
in In re Village at Camp Bowie held that the Bankruptcy Code cramdown re-
quirement in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) that at least one impaired class accept the 
reorganization plan did not distinguish between economic and discretionary im-
pairment. Rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s holding that § 1129(a)(10) included a 
motive inquiry, the Fifth Circuit instead held that no policy implications could be 
read into the plain language of the provision. This Comment argues that the Fifth 
Circuit correctly interpreted § 1129(a)(10) as allowing artificial impairment, but 
missed the opportunity to influence other courts by not adequately supporting its 
conclusion with an analysis of the Bankruptcy Code’s structure or historical de-
velopment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Code requires a court to confirm a debtor’s Chapter 11 
plan for reorganization if, among other requirements, the debtor can satisfy 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) by securing a vote in favor of the plan from at least one 
class of impaired creditors.1 In many bankruptcy cases, particularly when a 
single-asset real estate debtor files a plan, a great deal rests on creating an im-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012). The purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization is to 
allow a financially troubled enterprise to rehabilitate its equity and debt and to continue operating. See 
Ali M.M. Mojdehi & Janet Dean Gertz, The Implicit “Good Faith” Requirement in Chapter 11 Liqui-
dations: A Rule in Search of A Rationale?, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 143, 151 (2006); Paul J. 
Unger, Prohibiting Multiple Classification and Artificial Impairment in Single Asset Chapter 11 Cas-
es: The Creditor’s Veto—Its Power Congress Did Not Intend, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 541, 544 (1994). An 
entity may reorganize under Chapter 11 only when the value of continuing its operation exceeds its 
liquidation value. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). A plan will group claims—rights to payment—
that are substantially similar to one another into a single class. Id. § 101(5)(A) (2012) (defining 
“claim”); id. § 1122 (2012) (regarding classification). A class is impaired if the plan does not leave the 
rights of the creditors in that class unaltered. Id. § 1124 (2012). A plan can be confirmed if all classes 
accept the plan. Id. § 1129(a). Alternatively, pursuant to § 1129(b)(1), if “at least one class of claims 
that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan” and all the requirements of § 1129(a)—other 
than paragraph 8, which requires that all impaired classes accept the plan—are met, then the court 
“shall confirm the plan” as long as it is “fair and equitable.” Id. § 1129(a)(8), (a)(10), (b)(1). Through-
out this Comment, “11 U.S.C.” will be referred to as the “Bankruptcy Code.” 
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paired class that is not dominated by a secured creditor so that this class will 
vote in favor of the plan.2 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code governs reorganization proceedings and 
protects the debtor throughout the bankruptcy process.3 The Bankruptcy Code 
provides the debtor a right to be heard in reorganization and gives the debtor the 
exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days.4 Further, the Bankruptcy Code requires 
that a plan contain provisions that are consistent with the creditors’ interests as 
well as the equity holders’ interests.5 Nevertheless, in cramdown—which is a 
plan confirmation process under § 1129(b) in which a plan can be confirmed over 
the objections of creditors—even where a debtor’s interests are fully protected by 
a reorganization plan, a single impaired creditor may still have the power to pre-
vent a plan from being confirmed.6 In these cases, artificially impairing these 
creditors may be the only practical tool the debtor has to protect itself.7 
The concept of impairment in the Bankruptcy Code has evolved through a 
series of congressional amendments.8 Over time, Congress has consistently 
removed constraints on a plan’s ability to impair creditors.9 For example, be-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchising the Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial Classification or 
Artificial Impairment, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281, 281–82 (1992) (stating that single-asset debtors often 
find § 1129(a)(10) the biggest barrier to plan confirmation because a single creditor’s large-value loan 
dominates both the secured and unsecured classes). 
 3 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2012); id. § 1109(b) (stating that a debtor has a right to be heard 
on the matter of reorganization); Denise R. Polivy, Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11: A Compre-
hensive Compilation of Current Case Law, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 194–95 (1998) (stating that 
Chapter 11 promotes consensual reorganization plans, but the court may nonetheless confirm a debt-
or’s plan over the objections of some creditors). 
 4 See § 1109(b); id. § 1121(c) (right to file). 
 5 See id. § 1123(a)(7) (imposing this requirement); Jennifer Kent, Comment, Quality, Not Quanti-
ty: The Implications of Redefining Insurance Neutrality in In Re Global Industrial Technologies, Inc., 
53 B.C. L. REV. 345, 345 (2012) (noting the importance of parties impacted by Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions having a voice in reorganization); see also In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (Bowie I), 454 B.R. 
702, 709–10 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d, 710 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that Congress 
created numerous provisions to protect equity holders). 
 6 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 281–82. 
 7 See Unger, supra note 1, at 576–78 (noting that without artificial impairment, the undersecured 
creditor has complete power to veto a reorganization plan). See generally infra notes 14–15 and ac-
companying text (defining “artificial impairment”). 
 8 See In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d 940, 942–43 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the Bank-
ruptcy Code’s “old ‘material and adverse effect’ standard” in the former § 507 (repealed 1979) re-
quired a negative impact to a creditor whereas the impairment standard in the current § 1124 does 
not); David Gray Carlson, Artificial Impairment and the Single Asset Chapter 11 Case, 23 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 339, 355–56 (1994) (noting that the 1994 amendment to the § 1124 definition of impairment has 
made it an easily met standard). 
 9 See Unger, supra note 1, at 576 (arguing that because Congress did not retain language that 
would have prohibited slight impairment, Congress did not intend to prohibit slight impairment). 
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 507 (repealed 1979) (stating that only creditor materially and adversely impact-
ed by a plan are affected), with id. § 1124 (2012) (stating that any change to a creditor’s interest im-
pairs the creditor). See generally In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 834 (W.D. Wis. 1983) 
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fore 1978, the Bankruptcy Code only allowed a “materially and adversely af-
fected” creditor to vote on a plan.10 Today, the “materially and adversely af-
fected” standard has been replaced by impairment in 11 U.S.C. § 1124, which 
classifies a class as impaired if the plan does not leave the rights of the credi-
tors in that class unaltered.11 Moreover, for a plan to be confirmed in 
cramdown, § 1129(a)(10) requires that “at least one class” of impaired credi-
tors must vote in favor of the plan.12 In addition to changing the standard gov-
erning which creditors can vote in a cramdown, in 1994, Congress again liber-
alized the cramdown requirements when it repealed § 1124(3), thus further 
broadening the concept of impairment.13 As a result, any change of a creditor’s 
rights is considered “impairment,” including paying a creditor in full at the 
effective date of a plan rather than the originally scheduled payment date.14 
Because this type of legal impairment has minimal factual impact on a creditor, 
it is considered “artificial impairment.”15 
Federal appeals courts disagree regarding whether § 1129(a)(10) prevents 
a debtor from impairing a class merely to create one accepting vote for a reor-
ganization plan.16 In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held 
in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (Bowie II) that the plain language of 
§ 1129(a)(10) is unambiguous, and so no motive inquiry could be read into the 
provision.17 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit rejected the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit’s 1993 In re Windsor on the River Associates, Ltd. hold-
                                                                                                                           
(explaining that the concept of impairment derives from the older bankruptcy term “affected credi-
tor”). 
 10 See 11 U.S.C. § 861 (repealed 1978); In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127, 131 
(8th Cir. 1993) (explaining changes to the Bankruptcy Code). 
 11 See § 1124. See generally id. § 507 (repealed 1979) (stating the material and adverse effect 
standard). 
 12 Id. § 1129(a)(10) (2012); In re Polytherm, 33 B.R. at 834. Section 861 was removed, as it al-
lowed debtors to prevent creditors from recouping the full value of their investment by paying out the 
value of a secured interest based upon the valuation of the property at the time of filing for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 131; see Carlson, supra note 8, at 353–54 (stating that prior to 
1984, it was not necessarily true that a yes-voting class needed to be impaired). 
 13 11 U.S.C. § 1124(3) (repealed 1994) (stating that a creditor is not impaired if it receives cash 
equal to its claim). 
 14 See id. § 1124 (2012); see also Carlson, supra note 8, at 369–71 (explaining that under 
§ 1124(3), a creditor could be cashed out at a plan’s effective date without being paid interest starting 
from the date of the initial proceeding because this provision deemed the class to be unimpaired). 
 15 See Eric W. Lam, On the River of Artificial and Arbitrary Impairment: An Erroneous Analysis, 
70 N.D. L. REV. 993, 1005 (1994). See generally id. at 1003 (arguing that Congress specifically aban-
doned the “materially and adversely affected” standard of the Bankruptcy Act to remove any question 
of degree of impairment when determining if a class has the power to vote). 
 16 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 311. Compare In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (Bowie II), 710 
F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that any class impaired under § 1124 satisfies § 1129(a)(10)), 
with In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132 (holding that impairment driven by debtor discretion does not satisfy 
§ 1129(a)(10)). 
 17 See 710 F.3d at 245. 
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ing that § 1129(a)(10) incorporates an inquiry into a plan proponent’s motive 
for impairing a class to ensure that it is driven by economic necessity.18 
Part I of this Comment provides the procedural history of the Chapter 11 
reorganization plan for Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (the “Debtor”).19 Part II 
then analyzes the Eighth Circuit’s rationale for holding that § 1129(a)(10) in-
corporates a motive inquiry, and how the Fifth Circuit came to the opposite 
conclusion.20 Lastly, Part III argues that although a motive inquiry should not 
be read into the § 1129(a)(10), the Fifth Circuit missed the opportunity to in-
fluence other courts by failing to analyze the structure and historical develop-
ment of the Bankruptcy Code in reaching its decision.21 
I. PROBLEMS WITH CRAMDOWN: WESTERN’S OBJECTIONS TO THE 
DEBTOR’S REORGANIZATION PLAN 
In 2004, the Debtor in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (Bowie I) pur-
chased a mixed-use development in Fort Worth, Texas.22 The Debtor funded 
the acquisition with $10,000,000 in equity and two promissory notes allowing 
it to borrow up to $36,535,000.23 When the notes came due on February 11, 
2010, the Debtor defaulted.24 After the last of a series of forbearance agree-
ments expired on July 9, 2010, Western Real Estate Equities, LLC (“West-
ern”), purchased the notes for a discount at auction.25 Western then posted the 
property for foreclosure sale in August 2010.26 The day before the sale, the 
Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking relief from the fore-
closure proceedings.27 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See id.; In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132. 
 19 See infra notes 22–51 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 52–88 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 89–105 and accompanying text. 
 22 454 B.R. at 705. The property is 23.08 acres. Id. 
 23 Id. The Debtor executed a promissory note for approximately $10,000,000 with SouthTrust 
Bank and a promissory note for $26,535,000 with Texas Capital Bank, National Association. Id. Wa-
chovia Bank then became the successor of both notes by merger and by assignment, respectively. Id. 
Subsequently, Wachovia modified the notes’ original maturity date of January 22, 2008, a number of 
times before the maturity date was finally set for February 11, 2010. Id. 
 24 Id. at 705–06. The Debtor still owed $31,292,824 on the notes. Id. 
 25 Id. at 706. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 242. Filing a petition in bankruptcy court automatically triggers a stay. 11 
U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). When the proceedings involve property, the stay suspends all action to pos-
sess or exercise control over the property. Id. § 362(a)(3). The stay remains in effect until the case is 
closed, dismissed, or until a discharge is granted. Id. § 362(c)(2)(A)–(C). 
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Subsequently, the Debtor filed a reorganization plan on November 29, 
2010 to allow it to continue operating the property and to repay its creditors.28 
After a series of court-directed modifications, the Debtor filed the plan at issue 
(the “Plan”) on May 7, 2011.29 
The Plan impaired two creditor classes by delaying or reducing payment 
of their claims.30 Class 1, consisting of Western’s secured claim, would receive 
a new five-year note equaling the value of its secured claim with deferred in-
terest payments.31 Class 2, consisting of thirty-eight unsecured trade creditors, 
would be fully paid three months after the effective date of the Plan, but would 
not receive interest payments for this delay.32 Because only impaired classes 
may vote on reorganization plans, and Western voted its higher-value claim 
against reorganization, there were insufficient votes to confirm the Plan under 
§ 1129(a)—which requires the approval of each class of creditors.33 
Despite being voted down by an impaired class, the court found the plan 
could still be confirmed through a cramdown under § 1129(b).34 Section 1129(b) 
requires a court to confirm a plan as long as it does not discriminate unfairly 
against classes, it is fair and equitable to the impaired classes that have not ac-
cepted the plan, and it conforms to all provisions in § 1129(a), save the require-
ment that all impaired classes accept the plan.35 Instead of requiring acceptance 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 242; Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 706. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2012) 
(stating that the debtor has an exclusive right to file a reorganization plan for up to 120 days from the 
time the order of relief has been granted). 
 29 Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 706; Appellant’s Brief at 10–11, Bowie II, 710 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(No. 12-10271), 2012 WL 1965466, at *10–11 (May 25, 2012). The Debtor’s original plan for reor-
ganization only called for a $600,000 infusion of equity, and the court advised that an infusion of at 
least $1,000,000 would be needed for confirmation. Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 706. The Plan subsequently 
called for a $1,500,000 infusion of equity. Id. 
 30 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 243; see supra note 1 (defining impairment and classes of claims). 
 31 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 243. A claim is secured if it is backed by an interest in property. See 11 
U.S.C. § 506 (2012). Western’s new five-year note also provided for a balloon payment on the princi-
pal at the end of the five years. Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 243. 
 32 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 243. In total, the Debtor owed the trade creditors approximately $60,000. 
Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 706. Trade creditors provide goods and services that allow a business or property 
to operate. See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1280 (5th Cir. 1991). A plan may 
create a class consisting of all unsecured claims if their value is under an amount set by the court such 
that grouping the claims is “reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1122(b) (2012). 
 33 Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 707; 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (2012) (stating that any class not impaired is 
presumed to have accepted a plan); id. § 1129(a) (2012). Only where each class has accepted the plan, 
by at least one-half in number of the claims in that class and two-thirds in amount of the total value of 
that class, can the court confirm the plan without resorting to § 1129(b), the cramdown provision. See 
11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)–(d). See generally id. § 1129(b). Classes that are not impaired are deemed to 
impliedly accept the reorganization plan and so have no voting power. See id. § 1126(f). 
 34 See Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 711; supra note 1 (explaining confirmation through § 1129(b)). 
 35 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). See generally id. § 1129(a)(8) (requiring that all classes of credi-
tors either accept the plan or are not impaired by the plan). The unfair treatment requirement ensures 
that a plan does not treat members of a class in a different manner from other claims in the same class. 
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by all impaired classes, § 1129(b) requires only that a plan satisfy § 1129(a)(10), 
which is met if at least one impaired class accepts the plan.36 Because the court 
can thus have the plan “crammed down the throats” of objecting classes, the 
§ 1129(b) confirmation process is popularly termed “cramdown.”37 
Because the Debtor was financially capable of leaving the unsecured trade 
creditors unimpaired, Western argued that the Plan failed to meet the standards 
of § 1129(a)(10) and was thus unconfirmable.38 Western claimed that because 
the Debtor had sufficient funds to pay the trade creditors at the Plan’s effective 
date, the Debtor artificially impaired Class 2 by deferring payment merely to 
create an accepting impaired class for cramdown confirmation.39 This, Western 
argued, is an improper motive for impairing a class, as the Debtor did not have 
an economic motive for impairing the unsecured trade creditors.40 
The bankruptcy court rejected Western’s argument, found that the Plan 
conformed to the requirements of § 1129(a)(10), and thereafter confirmed an 
amended version of the Plan on January 9, 2012.41 Allowing the artificially 
impaired class to satisfy § 1129(a)(10), the court relied on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 1985 ruling in In re Sun Country Development, 
Inc.42 There, the Fifth Circuit noted that artificially impairing classes is per-
                                                                                                                           
Richard Maloy, A Primer on Cramdown—How and Why it Works, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 7 (2003). 
The fair and equitable requirement protects classes against losing their priority claims from classes of 
a different rank. Id. at 13. 
 36 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10), (b). 
 37 See Maloy, supra note 35, at 3–4 (internal quotations omitted) (stating that the Bankruptcy 
Code does not refer to § 1129(a)(10) as “cramdown;” it is only a term of art). 
 38 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 243. 
 39 Id. The effective date of the plan is the date on which the court-approved reorganization plan 
takes effect. See Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 551, 560 (1995). Artificial impairment occurs when the value of the entity is greater than 
its outstanding debt. See In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 131–32. 
 40 See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 29, at 13–14. Western argued that because the Debtor owed 
the unsecured trade creditors approximately $60,000, and that cash flow projections showed that the 
Debtor would be holding $1,419,281 after paying the unsecured trade creditors and all other projected 
payments at the effective date of the plan, there was no economic motivation for impairing the unse-
cured trade creditors. Id. 
 41 Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 710 (confirming the plan in part because it conformed to § 1129(a)(10)); 
id. at 715 (denying the plan in part without prejudice because the court found that the proposed inter-
est rate of 7.44% on the Class 1 notes was too high); see Appellant’s Brief, supra note 29, at 4 (noting 
confirmation of the amended plan). The bankruptcy court stated it would only confirm the amended 
Plan if Western and the Debtor agreed on a cramdown interest rate of between 6.27% and 6.59% for 
the five-year note. Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 715. For the January 9, 2012 plan, the parties agreed to a 6.4% 
interest rate. Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 243 n.2; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 29, at 4. 
 42 Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 710–11; see In re Sun Country Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 
1985). The bankruptcy court noted that the ruling was not based on precedent, as the Fifth Circuit had 
not yet directly addressed the issue of artificial impairment. Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 710. 
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missible, as it merely involves using a tool that Congress created in the Bank-
ruptcy Code.43 
On January 17, 2012, Western appealed to the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas to stay the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order.44 
On January 25, the bankruptcy court ordered sua sponte that the case be direct-
ly appealed to the Fifth Circuit.45 Both parties then filed joint requests for di-
rect appeal, which the Fifth Circuit granted.46 
In Bowie II, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to 
confirm the plan.47 The Bowie II court held that, because the Bankruptcy Code 
definition of impairment is purposefully broad, and impairment is the only re-
quirement to be eligible to vote to accept the plan and meet § 1129(a)(10), 
placing any further restrictions on impairment would limit its role.48 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s holding in In re 
Windsor that § 1129(a)(10) incorporates a motive inquiry into the concept of 
impairment.49 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that this motive inquiry is incorpo-
rated to ensure that an accepting impaired class indicates some support for a 
reorganization plan.50 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that because the 
plain language of § 1129(a)(10) is unambiguous, reading any further require-
ment into the provision would violate elementary principles of statutory inter-
pretation.51 
                                                                                                                           
 43 In re Sun Country, 764 F.2d at 408. Although the court in In re Sun Country did note that artifi-
cial impairment was permissible, this statement had no precedential value since the court found the 
impairment at issue to be economically motivated, i.e., the impairment was not based solely on the 
discretion of the debtor and so was not artificial impairment. Id. 
 44 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 29, at 5. 
 45 Id. at 6. A court of appeals may have jurisdiction over a judgment otherwise under the jurisdic-
tion of the district court if it involves a question of law where there is no controlling decision in the 
circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) (2012). A court of appeals may also have jurisdiction if an imme-
diate appeal would “materially advance” the proceedings. Id. § 158(d)(2)(A)(iii). 
 46 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 29, at 6. 
 47 710 F.3d at 249. 
 48 See id. at 245. Section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code defines impairment in the negative, stating 
that a claim is impaired unless the “legal, equitable, and contractual rights” of the claim are left unal-
tered. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012). Although the Fifth Circuit explained that it was joining in the Ninth 
Circuit’s 1993 decision in In re L & J Anaheim Associates, that case did not make a determination on 
§ 1129(a)(10), but rather only held that the § 1124 definition of impairment includes no distinction of 
impairment “of a particular kind or degree.” See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245; In re L & J Anaheim As-
socs., 995 F.2d at 943. 
 49 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245; In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 131. 
 50 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245; In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 131. The Eighth Circuit held that allowing 
§ 1129(a)(10) to be manipulated would lead to inequitable cramdowns, which Congress expressly 
tried to prevent by including § 1129(a)(10) in the Bankruptcy Code. In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 131 (cit-
ing Meltzer, supra note 2, at 311–12). 
 51 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245–46. 
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II. THE DISAGREEMENT REGARDING MOTIVE INQUIRY IN IMPAIRMENT 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had the opportunity in 
Bowie II to take a stand on impairment.52 The Bowie II court primarily rejected 
the Eighth Circuit’s policy-based interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) be-
cause the Fifth Circuit found the language there, and in relevant provisions, 
clear and unambiguous.53 To support this decision, the Fifth Circuit explained 
that this reading did not rob § 1129(a)(10) of any purpose, and that the good 
faith requirement for plan confirmation adequately protects creditors from in-
equitable cramdowns.54 
Section A of this Part explains the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning for holding 
that § 1129(a)(10) requires that impairment arise from something more than 
merely a debtor’s “exercise of discretion.”55 Section B then examines the Fifth 
Circuit’s justification for its plain reading of § 1129(a)(10).56 
A. The Eighth Circuit: The Bankruptcy Code Inquires into a Plan’s  
Motive for Impairing a Class 
In 1993, in In re Windsor on the River Associates, Ltd., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit interpreted § 1129(a)(10) in light of congres-
sional intent for this provision to ensure creditor support for a plan.57 The In re 
Windsor court held that, to be consistent with congressional intent, there must 
be a motive inquiry in § 1129(a)(10).58 A motive inquiry both ensures that clas-
ses are only impaired when doing so is economically necessary and discour-
ages “side dealing” in bankruptcy proceedings.59 According to the In re Wind-
sor court, artificially impairing a class is inconsistent with this congressional 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See 710 F.3d 239, 244–45 (5th Cir. 2013). The Fifth Circuit had this opportunity because it was 
reviewing the issue of impairment de novo. See id. 
 53 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245–46; In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127, 132 
(8th Cir. 1993). See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012). 
 54 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 246–48. The Fifth Circuit assessed good faith by considering whether 
the totality of the circumstances suggested that the Plan was proposed to provide the entity a reasona-
ble chance of success at rehabilitation. Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 247; see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (defining 
the good faith requirement for plan confirmation). 
 55 See infra notes 57–71 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 72–88 and accompanying text. 
 57 7 F.3d at 131; see also Meltzer, supra note 2, at 320 (stating that if the purpose of § 1129(a)(10) 
is to establish support from creditors, the section should not be interpreted in a manner that defeats 
that purpose). See generally S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 128 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5914 (stating that at least one class must accept the plan). 
 58 7 F.3d at 132. 
 59 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 375 (4th ed. 1992)) (holding that a plain language interpretation of § 1129(a)(10) would de-
feat the purpose of the provision). See generally id. at 130 (stating that though statutory construction 
begins with the language of the statute itself, it is equally true that courts must also interpret a statute 
to give effect to its purpose). 
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intent as it enables confirmation of inequitable cramdown plans despite a lack 
of real support from any impaired class.60 Thus, the court held that if a legal, 
equitable, or contractual claim is changed solely as an exercise of the debtor’s 
discretion, then that class is not impaired for the purpose of satisfying 
§ 1129(a)(10).61 
According to the Eighth Circuit, a debtor’s artificial impairment of a class 
is problematic because it enables confirmation with only fabricated support from 
creditors.62 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that because Congress enacted 
§ 1129(a)(10) to indicate creditor support for a plan, the same provision cannot 
allow artificial impairment so as to contravene this policy goal.63 In In re Wind-
sor, the debtor scheduled repayment to the class of low-value unsecured trade 
creditors for sixty days after the plan’s effective date.64 Because the debtor had 
more than sufficient capital on hand to pay the trade creditors in full, the debtor 
artificially impaired the class.65 Artificial impairment, according to the In re 
Windsor court, allows a debtor to unfairly silence a lender’s valid objections to a 
plan, especially when a lender holds the majority of the debt at stake.66 
In addition, the Eighth Circuit articulated three arguments against allow-
ing artificial impairment to satisfy § 1129(a)(10) because such impairment 
could lead to negative impacts on financial markets.67 First, a debtor could use 
§ 1129(a)(10) to achieve favorable refinancing terms when the entity might not 
otherwise be robust enough to survive in the marketplace.68 Second, a lender 
might acquiesce to refinancing simply because the lender is aware that a debtor 
can easily achieve plan confirmation through § 1129(a)(10).69 Third, debtors 
could barter for a small-value unsecured creditor’s acceptance of a plan in ex-
change for providing the creditor amenable impairment terms.70 In sum, the 
Eighth Circuit believed that all three concerns demonstrate how the Bankrupt-
cy Code could become an alternative vehicle for entities to achieve refinancing 
through the courts rather than the marketplace.71 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See id. at 131. The Eighth Circuit further determined that artificial impairment could negatively 
impact financial markets. See id. 
 61 Id. at 132. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. at 130–31; see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 128 (stating that at least one class must ac-
cept the plan). But see In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 834–35 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (stating 
that the legislative history of § 1129(a)(10) is “not particularly informative”). 
 64 7 F.3d at 129. 
 65 See id. at 129–30. 
 66 See id. at 131–33. 
 67 Id. at 132. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.; cf. Meltzer, supra note 2, at 304–05 (explaining that in the typical artificial impairment 
case the debtor can easily obtain consent from an unsecured creditor). 
 70 In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132; see POSNER, supra note 59, at 375. 
 71 See In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132. 
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B. The Fifth Circuit: The Bankruptcy Code Plainly  
Allows Impairment of Any Kind 
In Bowie II, the Fifth Circuit flatly rejected the Eighth Circuit’s interpreta-
tion of § 1129(a)(10).72 Instead, the Fifth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code 
clearly defines impairment as any alteration to existing rights, even if this altera-
tion is merely an exercise of discretion rather than based on economic necessi-
ty.73 Furthermore, the court held that, when read plainly, § 1129(a)(10) retains a 
purpose in the Bankruptcy Code.74 Lastly, the court dismissed the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s policy concerns, explaining that the Bankruptcy Code’s good faith re-
quirement adequately protects against confirming inequitable plans through 
cramdown.75 
The Fifth Circuit first concluded that the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of 
impairment does not contain any qualifications beyond its plain meaning.76 Un-
der the fundamental rules of statutory interpretation, a statute must be read liter-
ally where there is no ambiguity.77 Accordingly, the Bowie II court observed that 
11 U.S.C. § 1124 states unambiguously that any alteration of a right, even an 
enhancement, constitutes impairment, and thus declined to read any other quali-
fications into the statute.78 Turning to 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(1), the court did not 
find any ambiguity introduced by the provision’s statement that a plan may “im-
pair or leave unimpaired” any class.79 Because § 1129(a)(10) only requires one 
impaired class to accept the plan for it to be confirmed, the court explained that 
§ 1129(a)(10) does not narrow the meaning of impairment under § 1124 and 
§ 1123(b)(1).80 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See 710 F.3d at 245. See generally Meltzer, supra note 2, at 310 (noting that few cases have 
directly addressed this issue). 
 73 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245; infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 74 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 246–47; infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. See generally In 
re Sun Country Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining that when statutory language 
allows cramdown, Congress intended debtors to use that provision). 
 75 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 247–48; see infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. See generally 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012) (defining the good faith requirement). 
 76 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245. 
 77 Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002). Statutory construction begins by ana-
lyzing whether the language has a plain and unambiguous meaning. Id. 
 78 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 246. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012) (stating that any alteration is 
an impairment); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 319 (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code cares neither how 
small the alteration is, nor even if the alteration benefits the impaired party). Moreover, even if the 
language is ambiguous, the court was not persuaded that the legislative history indicated any discerni-
ble intent behind § 1129(a)(10). Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 246. 
 79 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245 (stating that nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code is impairment 
distinguished as either economic or discretionary). See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(1) (2012). 
 80 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245 (stating that reading a motive inquiry into the text of the Bank-
ruptcy Code “warps” the text). See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). 
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Second, the Fifth Circuit observed that, despite allowing artificial im-
pairment, § 1129(a)(10) will retain a purpose.81 In the typical case involving an 
undersecured lender, the lender’s unsecured deficiency claim often controls the 
unsecured class.82 This lender can prevent cramdown by voting against the 
plan to ensure that no class can accept and that the plan cannot satisfy 
§ 1129(a)(10).83 To satisfy § 1129(a)(10) and achieve confirmation in cases 
involving an undersecured lender, a debtor can create a small unsecured credi-
tor class and artificially impair the class knowing that this class will accept the 
plan.84 In contrast, prohibiting artificial impairment, as the In re Windsor court 
did, ignores this use of § 1129(a)(10).85 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Bankruptcy Code’s good faith 
requirement will avoid confirming inequitable plans through cramdown that 
could otherwise arise from a plain reading of § 1129(a)(10).86 For instance, if a 
debtor incurred a sham debt solely for the purpose of creating an impaired 
class to accept the plan, a court could block confirmation by finding that this 
plan was not proposed in good faith.87 Although artificial impairment could 
alone cause a plan to fail the good faith requirement, the Bankruptcy Code 
does not per se disallow it under § 1129(a)(10).88 
III. THE BOWIE II DECISION: A GOOD DECISION, BUT HALF DONE 
The Fifth Circuit’s endorsement of a debtor’s use of artificial impairment to 
satisfy 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s text, 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245. See generally In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 131 (noting that in typical 
single-asset bankruptcy cases, secured creditors often use § 1129(a)(10) to prevent cramdown and in 
so doing are employing the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition of impairment in § 1124 to effect a 
clear purpose). 
 82 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 246–47; see Meltzer, supra note 2, at 281–82 (explaining that this is due 
to the large-value loan of the undersecured creditor); id. at 282–85 (outlining the typical fact pattern in 
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case involving an undersecured creditor). A creditor is undersecured when 
the value of the underlying asset is less than the amount the debtor owes the creditor. See Meltzer, 
supra note 2, at 282–85. 
 83 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 281–82. An undersecured lender holds both a secured claim and 
an unsecured claim, and is able to prevent plan confirmation by exercising its right to vote pursuant to 
each claim. Id. 
 84 Id. at 282–85. The strategic isolation of a creditor’s unsecured deficiency claim from smaller 
creditor claims for the purpose of creating one class that the debtor knows will accept the plan is 
called “artificial classification.” Id. at 282. The debtor must usually create a separate small unsecured 
creditor class because regulations incentivize the secured creditor to realize present losses through 
liquidation rather than reorganization. Carlson, supra note 8, at 340. 
 85 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 246–47; In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 131. 
 86 Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 247–48; see also Meltzer, supra note 2, at 314–15 (explaining that courts 
approving of artificial impairment do not treat it as a good faith issue, but rather determine if the good 
faith requirement is met by looking at the totality of the circumstances). 
 87 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012); Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 248; see also Mojdehi & Gertz, supra note 
1, at 150 (explaining that the good faith requirement presupposes a valid reorganizational purpose). 
 88 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 248; Bowie I, 454 B.R. at 245 n.17. 
164 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:E. Supp. 
history, structure, and policy.89 The Fifth Circuit’s insistence that the Bankruptcy 
Code “must be read literally,” however, glosses over the more nuanced approach 
that the Supreme Court has undertaken when it examines the Bankruptcy 
Code.90 In addition to the Bankruptcy Code text, the historical development of 
bankruptcy doctrine and the structure of the Bankruptcy Code indicate that Con-
gress purposefully allows artificial impairment.91 Because the Bowie II decision 
did not analyze the structure and historical development of the Bankruptcy Code 
in this manner, it missed the opportunity to create a convincing argument that 
might sway other courts to adopt a plain meaning reading of § 1129(a)(10).92 
Both the historical development and the structure of the Bankruptcy Code 
indicate a policy in favor of permitting artificial impairment, which facilitates 
reorganization.93 The U.S. Supreme Court has identified three interpretive el-
                                                                                                                           
 89 See infra notes 90–105; Meltzer, supra note 2, at 316 (explaining that for a court to find that 
§ 1129(a)(10) prohibits artificial impairment it must look past the “literal language” of the provision to 
a statutory purpose). See generally Bowie II, 710 F.3d 239, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that to 
find artificial impairment does not satisfy § 1129(a)(10) injects meaning into the definition of impair-
ment that Congress explicitly rejected). 
 90 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 246; Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An 
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 275 (2000) (ex-
plaining that the Supreme Court decisions on the Bankruptcy Code usually involve determinations not 
only of the text, but of the structure and history of the Bankruptcy Code as well); see also Johnson v. 
Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87–88 (1991) (looking beyond the text of the Bankruptcy Code to its 
structure and finding that embedded policy decisions therein); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288–
90 (1991) (analyzing historical revisions to the Bankruptcy Code to determine the meaning of the text 
at issue). 
 91 See Unger, supra note 1, at 579 (stating that the Bankruptcy Code provides no textual basis for 
prohibiting artificial impairment); infra notes 93–105. See generally Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 90, at 
297 (explaining that lower courts should develop structural and historical development analyses of the 
Bankruptcy Code in their opinions). 
 92 Cf. Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 90, at 297 (discussing the importance of analyzing the structure 
and historical development of the Bankruptcy Code); see also supra notes 72–88 and accompanying 
text) (outlining the three major reasons the Fifth Circuit advances for finding artificial impairment 
permissible, none of which principally use the structure or historical development of the Bankruptcy 
Code as rationale). See generally Polivy, supra note 3, at 193 (stating that the majority of courts hold 
that artificial impairment does not satisfy § 1129(a)(10)); Unger, supra note 1, at 542 (discussing the 
disagreements over artificial impairment among federal courts). Compare In re Windsor on the River 
Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1992) (looking to the effects on financial markets to say that 
Congress could not have allowed artificial impairment), with Lam, supra note 15, at 995, 1004–05 
(determining that whether single-asset debtors should not be able to artificially impair a class is a 
policy decision to be left to Congress and that Congress established its position through gradual liber-
alization of cramdown and the concept of impairment). Importantly, single-asset real estate bankrupt-
cies have become increasingly common, causing increased debate over artificial impairment. Joseph J. 
Wielebinski & Davor Rukavina, Bankruptcy, 65 SMU L. REV. 279, 287 (2012). 
 93 See Unger, supra note 1, at 576–77 (detailing the historical developments to § 1124 and § 1129, 
resulting in the increased permissiveness of artificial impairment); id. at 544–45 (explaining that the 
purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization is to revitalize a failing enterprise and that cramdown is often 
the last hope for a debtor to achieve this goal). See generally Johnson, 501 U.S. at 87–88 (examining 
Bankruptcy Code policy through its structure); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 288–90 (examining historical 
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code); Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 90, at 295–96 (stating that a strict tex-
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ements for analyzing the Bankruptcy Code: its text, structure, and history.94 
Though the Court states that in some cases the text alone can determine the 
outcome, the Justices rarely agree on when the text is in fact determinative.95 
Problematically then, although the Fifth Circuit analyzed the text of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1124 and 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(1) in concert with § 1129(a)(10) to determine 
the definition of impairment, the court did little to bolster its textual reading.96 
The historical development of the term “impairment” reveals Congress’s 
intent to remove limitations on a plan’s ability to impair creditors.97 Congress 
has consistently ensured minimal constraints on what constitutes impairment 
for a class to accept a plan and allow a debtor to satisfy § 1129(a)(10).98 Had 
Congress not intended artificial impairment to be permissible, it would not 
have revised § 1124 to allow “any” change in a creditor’s rights to satisfy 
§ 1129(a)(10).99 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit relied on unpersuasive legis-
                                                                                                                           
tual approach usually split the Court, while opinions examining text, structure, and history together 
resulted in more near-unanimous opinions). 
 94 See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 90, at 275; see also Rake v. Wade, 508 US 464, 471 (1993) 
(holding that the Court should first examine the text of the Bankruptcy Code); Johnson, 501 U.S. at 
87–88 (holding that the Court can analyze Bankruptcy Code policy through its structure); Grogan, 498 
U.S. at 288–90 (holding that the historical development of the Bankruptcy Code can determine textual 
meaning). 
 95 See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 90, at 270–71 (explaining that the Court unanimously agreed in 
only four of the forty-one non-constitutional Bankruptcy Code cases it heard up through 2000 that the 
text alone was determinative). In total, sixty-three percent of the cases were decided on non-textual 
grounds, whereas only thirty-seven percent were decided on textual grounds. Id. at 275. See, e.g., 
Rake, 508 U.S. at 465–66 (holding unanimously that the text of the Bankruptcy Code at issue was 
clear); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 389–92 (1993) (holding that 
though the language of the Bankruptcy Code at issue alone was not determinative, the historical de-
velopment of the Bankruptcy Code confirmed its meaning). 
 96 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 246 (hinting merely that Congress had already considered a materiali-
ty requirement and rejected it); Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 90, at 297 (explaining that courts should 
write opinions discussing Bankruptcy Code structure and the historical development of bankruptcy 
doctrine); supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text (detailing the Bowie II court’s analysis of im-
pairment). 
 97 See Unger, supra note 1, at 576 (explaining that because Congress did not retain language that 
would have prohibited artificial impairment, Congress did not intend to prohibit artificial impairment). 
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 507 (repealed 1979) (stating that only creditors materially and adversely im-
pacted by a plan are affected), with id. § 1124 (2012) (stating that any change to a creditor’s interest 
impairs the creditor). See generally In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 834 (W.D. Wis. 1983) 
(explaining that the concept of impairment derives from the older bankruptcy term “affected credi-
tor”). 
 98 See Lam, supra note 15, at 1003 (stating that Congress specifically abandoned the “materially 
and adversely affected” standard of the Bankruptcy Act to remove any question of degree of impair-
ment when determining if a class has the power to vote); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (indicating, with-
out qualifications, that any change to a creditor’s interest is impairment). 
 99 Cf. Unger, supra note 1, at 576 (explaining that because Congress did not retain language that 
would have prohibited artificial impairment, Congress did not intend to prohibit it); id. at 577 (stating 
that § 1124 does not expressly or impliedly prohibit impairment, and even specifies three ways in 
which a plan may leave claims unimpaired); see also John R. Clemency & Nancy J. March, “Artificial 
Impairment” and the Elusive Accepting Impaired Class in Single Asset Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 12 
166 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:E. Supp. 
lative history and economic policy to rule against allowing artificial impair-
ment.100 Conversely, the Fifth Circuit’s textual reading is supported by the 
statutory development of bankruptcy doctrine.101 
Furthermore, when a plan otherwise conforms to the requirements for a 
valid reorganization plan and furthers the purposes of Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions, allowing artificial impairment to satisfy § 1129(a)(10) is consonant with 
the structure of the Bankruptcy Code.102 The Bankruptcy Code’s structure in-
dicates a policy towards both protecting the debtor’s equity interest and avoid-
ing an inequitable plan confirmation despite any real creditor support.103 In-
deed, the structure of the Bankruptcy Code as a whole indicates that artificial 
impairment serves a legitimate purpose, as it allows a debtor to create a small, 
secured class that will accept the plan and satisfy § 1129(a)(10).104 Particularly 
                                                                                                                           
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 21, 21 (1993) (explaining that § 1129(a)(10) was changed partly because, under 
the old Bankruptcy Code, creditors wielded too much influence over creditors during reorganization). 
But see Meltzer, supra note 2, at 319–20 (arguing that allowing artificial impairment to satisfy 
§ 1129(a)(10) defeats the provision’s purpose and that bankruptcy courts should employ something 
akin to a reasonableness standard to ensure the provision is not deprived of all meaning). 
 100 See Scott F. Norberg, Debtor Incentives, Agency Costs, and Voting Theory in Chapter 11, 46 
U. KAN. L. REV. 507, 537–38 (1998) (explaining that the 1978 legislative report on the Bankruptcy 
Code provided no insight into § 1129(a)(10) and that there was no report on the 1984 revisions). See 
generally In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132 (citing to 1978 legislative history as support for its conclusion 
that Congress intended for § 1129(a)(10) to ensure creditor support for a plan); supra notes 57–71 
(discussing the In re Windsor court’s reasoning in full). Note that when the Supreme Court analyzes 
the Bankruptcy Code, it disfavors relying upon on isolated legislative history. Gebbia-Pinetti, supra 
note 90, at 296. Moreover, the Court disfavors appeals to policy concerns unsupported by the Bank-
ruptcy Code itself. Id. 
 101 See Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 245; supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text; see also Unger, 
supra note 1, at 579 (stating that because the overriding purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to reha-
bilitate debtors, allowing artificial impairment is consistent with this goal). 
 102 See Unger, supra note 1, at 576–78 (explaining that not allowing artificial impairment runs 
counter to policies embedded in the Bankruptcy Code because it gives a single creditor the power to 
veto a plan, even one that protects the hostile creditor’s interest, where in all ways the plan fulfills the 
requirements of reorganization); infra notes 103–105 and accompanying text. 
 103 See Mojdehi, supra note 1, at 151 (stating that a purpose of reorganization is to produce a 
return for equity investors); Unger, supra note 1, at 579 (concluding that because Chapter 11’s pur-
pose is the debtor’s rehabilitation and ensuring and equitable plan, it is groundless to prohibit artificial 
impairment); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012) (establishing a good faith requirement for all plan 
confirmations). See generally In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132 (reasoning that the potential for this inequi-
ty supported its holding that Congress did not intend artificial impairment); Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 
90, at 280 (suggesting that the Court looks to the Bankruptcy Code to determine underlying policy, not 
to external sources). 
 104 See Unger, supra note 1, at 577–78 (stating that the structure of the Bankruptcy Code indicates 
an embedded policy towards allowing artificial impairment); see also supra notes 81–85 and accom-
panying text (discussing this use of § 1129(a)(10) in full). The good faith requirement will prevent 
debtors from using artificial impairment to confirm a plan without any real creditor support. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3); Bowie II, 710 F.3d at 248; see also Meltzer, supra note 2, at 314–15 (explaining 
that courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine if the good faith requirement is met); 
Mojdehi & Gertz, supra note 1, at 150 (explaining that the good faith requirement presupposes a valid 
reorganizational purpose). 
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in cases involving an undersecured creditor with an opportunity to control mul-
tiple classes, artificial impairment may be the only practical tool the debtor has 
to protect itself.105 
CONCLUSION 
Driven by basic principles of statutory interpretation, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 2013 decision In re Village at Camp Bowie held 
that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) is unambiguous, and so the 
provision does not involve a motive inquiry into impairment. In doing so, the 
court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s holding that § 1129(a)(10) must incorporate 
a motive inquiry to protect congressional intent. Although the Fifth Circuit’s 
statutory interpretation of § 1129(a)(10) is correct, the court could have bol-
stered its argument by explaining how the historical development of bankrupt-
cy doctrine and the structure of the Bankruptcy Code supports a role for artifi-
cial impairment in certain situations. Thus, the court missed an important op-
portunity in the ongoing debate about the propriety of artificial impairment and 
the role that § 1129(a)(10) plays in plan confirmations. 
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 105 See Unger, supra note 1, at 576–78 (explaining that without artificial impairment, the under-
secured creditor has complete power to veto a reorganization plan). For instance, artificial impairment 
may protect a debtor where a vulture creditor is seeking a windfall through foreclosure at the debtor’s 
expense, as Western attempted to do in Bowie II. See 710 F.3d at 247 (stating that Western did not 
dispute that the Debtor had significant equity in the project, nor that the reorganization plan would 
allow it to stay current on its restructured payments); id. at 242 (stating that Western purchased the 
notes at a face-value discount to displace the Debtor as the owner of the property). 
 
 
 
